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THE IMPORT SURCHARGE OF 1971: A
CASE STUDY OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN
FOREIGN COMMERCE
I.

INTRODUCTION

The importance of foreign trade in the conduct of foreign affairs
demonstrates that many foreign commerce questions contain foreign affairs overtones. For example, President Nixon has recently
noted that congressional restrictions on granting the Soviet Union
most-favored-nation treatment would be "a hurdle to further detente."' Although article I, section 8 of the Constitution vests the
power to regulate foreign commerce in the legislative branch, 2 the
Congress has delegated a great deal of that power to the Executive.
Moreover, it appears that the President possesses certain inherent
powers in foreign commerce as a result of his extensive, albeit
undefined, authority in foreign affairs. An examination of the President's foreign affairs power, therefore, is required to determine the
extent of this derivative authority in the field of foreign commerce.
The Import Surcharge of 1971, pursuant to which the President
imposed a ten per cent surcharge on goods imported into the
United States in an effort to correct the balance of payments deficit, provides a useful vehicle for conducting an examination of the
convergence of the statutory delegation in the area of tariff regulation and the Executive's inherent powers in foreign commerce.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS

Executive authority over foreign commerce stems from statutory
delegations and the Executive's power to conduct foreign affairs,
which, in turn, is based on further statutory delegations, specific
grants of power by the Constitution and the inherent powers that
are derived from the President's position as the sole executive of
the nation as defined in the opening clause of article II of the
Constitution. Challenges to the exercise of executive authority in
the area of foreign commerce have focused on the extent of the
authority under these sources.
A.

The "Delegation" Question

To effectuate its legislation in the area of foreign trade, Congress
1. Wall Street J., Sept. 28, 1973, at 3, col. 1.
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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often has delegated its power over foreign commerce to the President.3 The constitutionality of such congressional delegation has
been challenged, but, for the most part, the challenges have been
unsuccessful.
Constitutional construction of the delegation of powers is rooted
in the tripartite system of government. Although the framers of the
Constitution provided for a separation of powers, 4 it has been denied that they contemplated a strict application of that separation. 5 Thus, in his treatise on the Constitution, Mr. Justice Story
commented:
But when we speak of a separation of the three great departments
of government and maintain that separation is indispensable to
public liberty we are to understand this maxim in a limited sense.
It is not meant to affirm that they must be kept wholly and entirely
separate and distinct and have no common link of connection or
dependence, the one upon the other in the slightest degree. The true
meaning is that the whole power of one of those departments should
not be exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power
of either of the other departments .... I
Despite the liberal interpretation of the separation doctrine itself,
however, the principle that the powers vested in the three branches
of government are separate remains deeply imbedded in constitutional law. The doctrine, as applied in the context of the delegation
of powers, means that legislative power is vested in Congress and
executive power in the President; a transfer of power from one to
the other would undermine the balance of the governmental struc7
ture.
The doctrine of separation of powers does not mean, however,
that the branches of government are not to coordinate their efforts
in making foreign policy.8 Many early delegations of power evidenced cooperation between Congress and the Executive. 9
CONST. art. I, § 8.
4. The doctrine of separation of powers is traceable to the common law maxim
of agency; delegata potestos non potest delegari. See Duff & Whiteside, Delegate
Potestas Non Potest Delegari: A Maxim of American Constitutional Lauw, 14
CORNELL L.Q. 168 (1929).
5. See 1 J. STORY, CONSTrrUTION 393 (5th ed. 1891); Cheadel, Delegation of
Legislative Functions, 27 YALE L.J. 892 (1918); 18 VA. L. REV. 424 (1932).
6. 1 J. STORY, supra note 5, at 393.
7. See K. MACKENZIE, TARIFF-MAKING AND TRADE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
AND CANADA 14 (1968).
8. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
9. For example, a 1794 act authorized the President, "whenever, in his opin-

3. U.S.
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Judicial interpretations of the delegation question have been
given sparingly. Chief Justice John Marshall explained the hesitant attitude of the courts in this way:
The difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that the
legislative makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law; but the maker of the law may commit something to
the discretion of the other departments, and the precise boundary
of this power is a subject of delicate and difficult inquiry, into which
a court will not enter unnecessarily.'"
Courts that have decided the issue of the constitutionality of delegability have premised their interpretations on the important distinction between the legislature's delegating power to make law
and merely conferring authority and discretion to execute the
law." Courts have sanctioned delegations of powers to nonlegislative bodies when those powers have "not in any real senses" been
legislative.'" Thus, a great deal of power not "strictly" or "exclusively" or "essentially" legislative has been delegated to administrative and executive bodies.' 3
Determining the differences between valid and invalid delegations has depended on the presence or absence of standards by
which the administrator may be guided in exercising his discretion.1 Courts sustaining delegations have reasoned that actual legion, the public safety shall so require, to lay an embargo on all ships and vessels
in the ports of the United States, or upon the ships and vessels of the United
States, or the ships and vessels of any foreign nations, under such regulations as
the circumstances of the case may require, and to continue or revoke the same
whenever he shall think proper." Act of June 4, 1794, ch. 41, § 1, 1 Stat. 372.
Similarly, numerous embargo and nonintercourse statutes were passed with caveats authorizing the President to impose, modify or suspend their provisions. See,
e.g., Act of March 3, 1805, ch. 41, § 5, 2 Stat. 341.
10. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825).
11. Cincinatti, W., & Z.R.R. v. Comm'rs, 1 Ohio St. 77, 88 (1852). See Field
v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693-94 (1892).
12. See, e.g., Buttfield v. Stanahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904) (Secretary of the
Treasury was given the power to establish tea standards).
13. See, e.g., Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924) (Secretary of Labor was
empowered to deport aliens); Inter-Mountain Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 476 (1914)
(Interstate Commerce Commission was given authority to fix railroad rates);
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) (Secretary of Agriculture was given
power to make rules and regulations for the protection of the government forest
reserve); Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907) (Secretary of
War was permitted to condemn bridges interfering with navigation); 36 YALE L.J.
573 (1927).
14.

See 15 CALIF. L. REv. 408 (1927).
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islative powers were not delegated, merely the power to find a fact
on which the statute was to become operative. Thus in Field v.
Clark,"1the Supreme Court upheld the legislative delegation, since
the President's function was limited to the factual determination
of whether the custom duties were "unequal and unreasonable."
At issue was section 3 of the Tariff Act of 1890,17 which authorized
the President to suspend the free entry of certain articles from
countries imposing certain restrictions on United States products
when he deemed those restrictions to be "reciprocally unequal and
unreasonable."" The Court concluded, however, that section 3 did
not conflict with the separation of powers doctrine. Once the President found, as a fact, that the foreign import restrictions were
unequal and unreasonable, the imposition of the penalties and
their amount were dictated by the statute rather than the President's discretion. Justice Harlan explained:
[The Act of 1890] does not, in any real sense, invest the President
with the power of legislation. . . .Legislative power was exercised
when Congress declared that the suspension [of the free introduction of specified products] should take effect upon a named contingency. What the President was required to do was simply in execution of the act of Congress. It was not the making of law. He was
the mere agent of the law-making department to ascertain and declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect., '
The Court relied on the early decision of The Brig Aurora,2 in
which the Supreme Court upheld a presidential embargo on goods
imported from Great Britain. Congress, in an act of 1809,21 had
authorized the embargo conditioned on the determination of cer15. See State v. Hinkel, 131 Wis. 103, 111 N.W. 217 (1907); 36 YALE L.J. 573
(1927).

16. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
17. Ch. 1244, § 3, 26 Stat. 612. Section 3 of the Act provided in pertinent part:
"[Wihenever, and so often as the President shall be satisfied that the Government of any country producing and exporting sugars, molasses, coffee, tea, and
hides, raw and uncured, or any of such articles, imposes duties, on other exactions
upon the agricultural or other products of the United States, which in view of the
free introduction of such [above products] . . .into the United States he may
deem to be reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, he shall have the power and
it shall be his duty to suspend, by proclamation to that effect, the provisions of
this act relating to the free introduction of such [above products] .
duction of such country, for such time as he shall deem just .. .

18.
19.
20.
21.

.

.the pro-

143 U.S. at 692.
143 U.S. at 692-93.
The Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813).
Act of March 1, 1809, ch. 24, §§ 4, 11, 2 Stat. 528.
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tain facts found by the President. 22 The Court in Field v. Clark
noted that even if the decision in The Brig Aurora had never been
rendered, "the practical construction of the Constitution, as given
by so many acts of Congress, and embracing almost the entire
period of our national existence, should not be overruled, unless
upon a conviction that such legislation was clearly incompatible
with the supreme law of the land. ' ' 23 The Court thus validated the
delegation of authority by Congress to the Executive.
The approval of the limited delegation of authority contemplated by Field v. Clark was extended in J. W. Hampton,Jr. & Co.
v. United States, 24 in which the Supreme Court established a new
criterion for determining the status of future delegations. The
emphasis in Field v. Clark was the definiteness of the "fact" to be
ascertained by the President. 25 Evaluated by this test, section 315
of the Tariff Act of 1922,26 which was at issue in the Hampton case,
went much further in giving the President the power to determine,
with the aid of advisors, the differences in costs of production at
home and abroad and to adjust the customs rates to equalize such
costs. The statutory provision was attacked on the ground that
"[t]he difference in cost of production at home and abroad cannot
be found as a fact without using discretion and judgment, choice
between different results, at every stage, thus expressing the exercise of the legislative will. ' 27 In overruling the contention, Chief
Justice Taft analogized to interstate commerce legislation: "The
rates to be fixed are myriad. If Congress were to be required to fix
every rate, it would be impossible to exercise the power at all
,21 The critical question for the Court was whether Congress
....
22. See generally K. MACKENZIE, supra note 7, at 4-5.
23. 143 U.S. at 691. See also Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 286 (1901);
Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 469 (1884); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819).
24. 276 U.S. 394 (1927).
25. See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT 124, (3d ed. 1957).
26. Ch. 356, § 315, 42 Stat. 941 (1922).
27. 276 U.S. at 395. The importers in this case had three main points in
contending that the flexible provisions of § 315 were unconstitutional: (1) that it
is an illegal attempt to delegate legislative and taxing power to the Executive;
(2) that the difference between costs at home and abroad was not a "fact" definitely ascertainable, and thus the President must depend on his judgment in
fixing new rates of duty, thereby violating the whole plan of the flexible provisions; and (3) that to levy an avowedly protective tax irrespective of revenue
considerations transcends the power of Congress.
28. 276 U.S. at 407. The Court said: "The same principle that permits Congress to exercise its rate-making power in interstate commerce, by declaring the
Vol. 7-No. 1
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had provided some standard to govern the exercise of presidential
discretion. In answering, the Court stated: "If Congress shall lay
down by legislative act an intelligibleprinciple to which the person
or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such
legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative
power."2 9 The Court found little difficulty in deeming the equalization feature of the Act constitutional, since the Act established an
"intelligible principle"-"equality"-to which the President was
to conform. The Executive was not performing a legislative function by writing the tariff; he was merely fleshing out the particulars
of an expressed policy too intricate for Congress to prescribe in
detail.30
The courts thus generally have agreed that Congress may grant
to the President the authority to act in the area of foreign commerce, a field traditionally occupied by the Congress itself. Due
largely to the increased complexity not only of international commercial activities but also of the internal operations of the Government itself, Congress has delegated much of its constitutionally
granted power over foreign commerce to the President, who has
been able to effectuate foreign commercial policy more efficiently
and expeditiously. As long as Congress includes in such legislation
an "intelligible principle" to serve as a standard to guide executive
conduct, a delegation of power to the Executive to act in the foreign commerce area will likely survive attacks on its constitutionality.
B.

The President'sInherent Powers in Foreign Commerce

In United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 31 the Government
brought suit against an importer who had violated the terms of an
rule which shall prevail in the legislative fixing of rates, and enables it to remit
to a rate-making body created in accordance with its provisions the fixing of such
rates, justifies a similar provision for the fixing of customs duties on imported
merchandise." 276 U.S. at 409.
29. 276 U.S. at 409 (emphasis added).
30. Appellant contended that, although there was an apparent standard, the
production factors were so varied and indefinite that the "fact" could never be
found. Therefore, since the standard was incapable of definite ascertainment, the
President, by making his determinations, was in effect setting the standard himself. This contention was not directly answered by the Court. See 76 U. PA. L.
REV. 868 (1928). It has been said that, "[a]ll in all, if the President exercised
every power delegated to him in section 315 of the Tariff Act of 1922, he could
rewrite the entire bill as soon as the Congress had finished it." J. LARKIN, THE
PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF THE TARIFF 2 (1936).
31. 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
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executive agreement with Canada. The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, finding that the President had failed to follow the
procedures established by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1922,32 which authorized him to limit certain imports based on the
Tariff Commission's investigations, findings and recommendations, held that the executive agreement was invalid because it
thus contravened provisions of a statute dealing with the very
matter to which the agreement related. The court explained:
We think that whatever the power of the executive with respect to
making executive trade agreements regulating foreign commerce in
the absence of action by Congress, it is clear that the executive may
not through entering into such an agreement avoid complying with
a regulation prescribed by Congress. Imports from a foreign country
are foreign commerce subject to regulation, so far as this country is
concerned, by Congress alone. The executive may not by-pass congressional limitations regulating such commerce by entering into an
agreement with the foreign country that the regulation be exercised
by that country through its control over exports. Even though the
regulation prescribed by the executive agreement be more desirable
than that prescribed by Congressional action, it is the latter which
must be accepted as the expression of national policy."
The court concluded that the President had acted outside constitutional limits by entering into an international compact that ran
counter to explicit congressional legislation. Noting that the President does possess certain inherent powers in conjunction with his
position as Commander in Chief and his power to insure that the
laws are faithfully executed, the court nevertheless refused to acknowledge that these inherent powers could preempt the express
delegation to Congress in the field of foreign commerce.
The view espoused by the court in Guy W. Cappsmay be considered overly restrictive when read in conjunction with the sourceg
and extent of the executive's foreign affairs power. In United
States v. Curtiss-WrightExport Corp.,"4 defendants were indicted
for violating a presidential proclamation, issued pursuant to a joint
resolution of Congress, prohibiting the sale of arms to countries
engaged in the Chaco conflict.3 5 Defendants demurred on the
32. Act of September 1, 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858.
33. 204 F.2d at 659-60.
34. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
35. A Joint Resolution of May 28, 1934, provided "[tihat if the President
finds that the prohibition of the sale of arms and munitions of war in the United
States to those countries now engaged in armed conflict in the Chaco may conVol. 7-No. 1
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ground that the resolution was an unconstitutional delegation of
power to the President. Justice Sutherland, writing for the majority, distinguished the powers of the federal government in foreign
affairs and domestic affairs. He propounded the theory that the
powers of external sovereignty possessed by the federal government
do not depend on affirmative grants of the Constitution, but
passed directly from the British crown to the colonies as a collective whole. The individual colonies never possessed any external
sovereignty and, therefore, had none to delegate to the federal
government under the Constitution. Moreover, participation in the
conduct of foreign affairs is limited; the President alone has the
authority to act as the representative of the nation. Justice Sutherland noted that the Court was not dealing merely with authority
delegated by Congress to the President, "but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations .
Since "congressional legislation
which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry
within the international field must often accord to the President a
degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which
would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved,"3
Justice Sutherland concluded that the joint resolution and proclamation were valid.
Justice Sutherland's theories concerning the origin of the federal
government's external sovereignty and the plenary authority of the
President in foreign affairs have been questioned." The most significant criticism is that the constitutional underpinnings of the
President's powers in foreign affairs and the relationships of these
"..."I'

tribute to the reestablishment of peace between those countries, and if after
consultation with the governments of other American Republics and with their
cooperation, as well as that of such other governments as he may deem necessary,
he makes proclamation to that effect, it shall be unlawful to sell, except under
such limitations and exceptions as the President prescribes, any arms or munitions of war in any place in the United States to the countries now engaged in
that armed conflict, or to any person, company, or association acting in the
interest of either country, until otherwise ordered by the President or by Congress." H.R.J. Res. 347, ch. 365, § 1, 48 Stat. 811 (1934). The President issued
two proclamations, one on the date of the Resolution, putting it into operation
(48 Stat. 1744); the other on November 14, 1935, revoking the first proclamation
(49 Stat. 3480).
36. 299 U.S. at 320.
37. 299 U.S. at 320.
38. See, e.g., Levitan, The ForeignRelations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946).
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powers to those of Congress remain undefined.
The only foreign affairs powers given to the President by the
Constitution are "the executive Power, ' 39 the power to make treaties and appoint ambassadors (with the advice and consent of the
Senate)4" and the powers under the President's role as Commander
in Chief.' The Constitution also states that the President shall
receive ambassadors and other public ministers and see that the
laws are faithfully executed.4 2 These enumerated powers, however,
are not sufficient to justify the wide range of powers exercised by
the Executive in foreign affairs.
Some commentators have attempted to support the President's
authority by looking beyond the enumerated powers.4 3 For example, from the power to appoint and receive ambassadors, some
have implied the powers to recognize governments and establish
diplomatic relations with them. Others have stated that the grant
of all executive powers is capable of sustaining the President's
foreign affairs authority. The first advocate of this position was
Alexander Hamilton. Writing in support of Washington's neutrality proclamation in 1793, Hamilton contended that the opening
clause of article II is a grant of power. 4 Furthermore, Hamilton
wrote, the succeeding enumerated powers served to interpret the
initial general grant. Finally, Hamilton argued that foreign policy
is an inherently executive function. 5 James Madison, on the other
hand, refuted Hamilton's expansive view of executive power in
foreign affairs. He emphasized that Congress' power to declare war
included the power to determine foreign policy.
Hamilton's theories comport with the political philosophies on
which the framers of the Constitution relied. Locke and Montesquieu had a great influence on the framers, as evidenced by the
structure of the government created. 7 Locke distinguished a feder39. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1: "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America ..

40. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
41. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
42. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
43. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTrrUTION 41-42 (1972).
44. Hamilton, writing over the pseudonym "Pacificus," first presented this
argument in a series of (1787-88) articles in The Gazette of the United States.
45. Hamilton's theory is discussed in E. CORWiN, supra note 25, at 179.
46. Madison, writing as "Helvidius," refuted Hamilton's arguments in a series of articles also appearing in the Gazette. See E. CORWIN, supra note 25, at
180-81.
47. L. HENKIN, supra note 43, at 43.
Vol. 7-No. 1
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ative power from the executive power. The former dealt with external affairs, while the latter was concerned with the execution of the
municipal laws within the society. 8 Yet, he recognized that both
powers are usually united. 9 Furthermore, this executive power required "prerogative" in fulfilling its functions.
For since in some [G]overnments the [L]aw-making [Plower is
not always in being and is usually too numerous, and so too slow,
for the dispatch requisite to [Ejxecution: and because also it is
impossible to foresee, and so by laws to provide for, all [A]ccidents
and [N]ecessities, that may concern the publick [sic]; or to make
such [L]aws, as will do no harm, if they are [E]xecuted with
inflexible rigour, on all occasions, and upon all [P]ersons, that may
come in their way, therefore there is a latitude left to the
[E]xecutive power, to do many things of choice, which the laws do
not prescribe.50
Montesquieu also divided executive power into that "in respect
to things dependent on the law of nations" and that "in regard to
matters that depend on the civil law."' Furthermore, he noted
that this branch is better administered by one than by many be52
cause of the need for dispatch.
The inadequacies of legislative control of foreign affairs, amply
demonstrated from 1783 to 1787 under the Articles of Confederation, also affected the framers. John Jay's desperate attempts to
obtain definite instructions from Congress to guide him in his negotiations with the Spanish and the subsequent failure to reach
any agreement must have indicated the weakness of the system.53
Discussing the treaty-making power under the proposed Constitution, Jay later wrote that "[s]o often and so essentially have we
48. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 383 (P. Laslett ed.
1960).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 160.
51. 1 MONTESQUIEU, THE Spmrr OF THE LAWS Book XI, Ch. V, at 182 (Aldine
ed. 1900).
52. Id. Book X1, Ch. VI, at 195-96.
53. The crux of the disagreement with Spain was that Spain had no intention
of abiding by the boundaries established by the English in the treaty of 1783 or
of admitting the right of Americans freely to navigate the Mississippi to its
mouth. Difficulties were also encountered with England, whose troops continued
to occupy territory along the northern border. Congress also desired to negotiate
a commercial agreement with the English. The inadequacy of the Confederation
was also demonstrated in the failure to halt the taking of American seamen by
the Barbary pirates. See A. McLAUGHLIN, THE CONFEDERATION AND THE
CONSTITUTION

89-107 (1905).
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heretofore suffered from the want of secrecy and dispatch that the
Constitution would have been inexcusably defective if no attention
had been paid to those objects."54
It is apparent that the framers of the Constitution intended to
grant the President substantial authority in the field of foreign
affairs, even though the constitutional underpinnings of the authority and its scope and extent are less than certain. Nevertheless,
in light of recent history, it is accurate to conclude that "[t]he
President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations,
and its sole representative with foreign nations. '55 The courts frequently have given the President wide latitude in the conduct of
foreign affairs. 6 In any particular activity, however, it is often
difficult to characterize the elements of the activity. For example,
in Chicago & Southern Airlines v. Waterman Corp.,57 the Supreme
Court considered the possibility of judicial review of the Civil Aeronautics Board's determination on applications by civilian carriers
to engage in overseas and foreign air transportation. The Board's
decisions were subject to approval by the President under section
801 of the Civil Aeronautics Act." The Court recognized both the
foreign commerce and foreign affairs considerations. The Court
held that prior to presidential approval the orders of the Board
were not mature, and, therefore, not susceptible of judicial review;
after approval the orders contained executive discretion and were
therefore "political questions." In reaching this decision, the
Court noted that presidential review was the result of legislative
and executive powers.
Congress may of course delegate very large grants of its power over
foreign commerce to the President . . . .The President also possesses in his own right certain powers conferred by the Constitution
on him as Commander in Chief and as the Nation's organ in foreign
affairs. For present purposes, the order draws vitality from either or
both sources. Legislative and Executive powers are pooled obviously
54. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 435 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Jay).
55. E. CORWIN, supra note 25, at 177. The statement was originally made by
John Marshall in the House of Representatives in 1799. Marshall was defending
President John Adams's extradition of one Jonathan Robbins under the Jay
Treaty. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800). The statement was taken out of context
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 319 (1936).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
57. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
58. 49 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970), formerly ch. 601, § 801, 52 Stat. 1014 (1938).
Vol. 7-No. 1
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to the end that commercial strategic and diplomatic interests of the
country may be coordinated and advanced without collision or
deadlock between agencies."
The implication is that if an activity impinges on foreign affairs,
the Executive may assert a certain degree of control. Thus, in
addition to statutory authority, the Executive cited constitutional
authority to enter the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.A0
The Executive relied on the broad language contained in CurtissWright, in which, as discussed above, the Court held that the
President's authority to impose an arms embargo was supported
by statutory authority and the plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal Government in the area
of foreign affairs.'
As noted in Curtiss-Wright, there are limitations on the President's power; for example, the applicable provisions of the Constitution.6 2 An additional limitation is the foreign affairs power possessed by Congress. Adhering to the views of Locke and Montesquieu, the framers sought to insure that the Executive could not
overpower the legislative branch. Congress possesses important
foreign affairs powers in the power to regulate foreign commerce 3
and the power to declare war. 4 In discussing the relationship of
Washington's neutrality proclamation to Congress' power to declare war, Alexander Hamilton wrote:
This serves as an example of the right of the executive, in certain
cases, to determine the condition of the nation, though it may, in
its consequences, affect the exercise of the power of the legislature
to declare war. Nevertheless, the executive cannot thereby control
the exercise of that power. The legislature is still free to perform its
duties, according to its sense of them; though the executive, in the
exercise of its constitutional powers, may establish an antecedent
state of things, which ought to weigh in the legislative branch.
59. 333 U.S. at 109-10.
60. Hearings on the Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Act Before the Senate
Finance Comm., 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1051-55 (1949) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings]. For a general discussion of the role the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade plays in United States domestic law see Jackson, The GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MicH. L. REv. 250
(1967).
61. Hearings,supra note 60, at 1051.
62. 299 U.S. at 320. Cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1954) (executive agreement
held to be subject to guarantees of Bill of Rights).
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
64. U.S. CONST. art, I, § 8, cl. 11.
Winter, 1973
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The division of the executive power in the Constitution creates a
concurrent authority in the cases to which it relates.65
Therefore, unless the Constitution vests an applicable power elsewhere, the Executive has the initiative in foreign affairs. He can
confront Congress with a fait accompli, although Congress is under
no obligation to support these decisions." As Professor Louis Henkin has noted, "[c]oncurrent power often begets a race for initiative and the President will usually 'get there first'."6
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,6" however, it was
determined that Congress had taken the initiative. President Truman, relying on his powers as Commander in Chief, had ordered
the seizure of steel mills to avert a nationwide strike of steel workers during the Korean War. Justice Black, writing for the majority,
held that the seizure was beyond the power of the President because it was essentially lawmaking, a function reserved for Congress. 9 Four of the six justices in the majority," however, noted
that not only had Congress not authorized the seizure technique,
but previously had refused to adopt a provision authorizing plant
act
seizure. 7' The implication of the holding is that the President's
72
would have been upheld if Congress had not acted at all.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Jackson distinguished three categories of Presidential action:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it in65. Quoted in E. CORWIN, supra note 25, at 179.
66. Id.at 180.
67. L. HENKIN, supra note 43, at 105.
68. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
69. "The President's order does not direct that congressional policy be executed in a manner prescribed by Congress-it directs that a presidential policy
be executed in a manner prescribed by the President.. . . The Constitution does
not subject this lawmaking power of Congress to presidential or military supervision or control." 343 U.S. at 588.
70. Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, Burton and Clark.
71. Congress had denied the President the power to seize plants in the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947. "It is one thing to draw an intention of
Congress from general language and to say that Congress would have explicitly
written what is inferred, where Congress has not addressed itself to a specific
situation. It is quite impossible, however, when Congress did specifically address
itself to a problem, as Congress did to that of seizure, to find secreted in the
interstices of legislation the very grant to power which Congress consciously withheld." 343 U.S. at 609 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
72. L. HENKIN, supra note 43, at 340-41 n.11.
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cludes all that he possess in his own right plus all that Congress can
delegate.
2. When the President acts in absence of either a Congressional
grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress
may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,
for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus
73
any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.
Justice Jackson concluded that the President's act fell within the
third category and that his inherent powers were not sufficient to
74
sustain the seizure.
From this brief overview, one can conclude that the President
possesses some inherent powers in foreign commerce as a result of
his power to conduct foreign affairs. A foreign commerce issue
often will fall within Justice Jackson's "zone of twilight" as a result
of the foreign affairs implications. Moreover, in this zone of twilight, presidential freedom of action will depend on congressional
inaction. Professor Henkin has stated that the area of concurrent
powers often involves presidential pretensions when congressional
authority is clear; therefore, in cases of conflict, Congress should
prevail, regardless which branch acted first.75 As he notes, this
position is consistent with the power of Congress to supercede
treaty provisions as domestic law. 76 Furthermore, if the President
acts, and Congress remains silent, a justifiable presumption arises
that Congress has acquiesed in, or even approved, the President's
actions.7 7 Although Congress can act subsequent to the Executive's
action, often the President will present a fait accompli that Congress will be hesitant to repudiate. The President, however, cannot
73. 343 U.s. 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
74. 343 U.S. at 654.
75. L. HENKIN, supra note 43, at 106.
76. Id. at 349 n.40. "By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same
footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared
by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is
given to either over the other. When the two relate to the same subject, the courts
will always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be
done without violating the language of either; but if the two are inconsistent, the
one last in date will control the other, provided always the stipulation of the
treaty on the subject is self-executing." Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194
(1888).
77. L. HENKIN, supra note 43, at 105.
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ignore Congress for various political reasons; congressional cooperation is required on many matters in addition to foreign policy. 8
Moreover, herein lies the ultimate check in the system of checks
and balances: knowing that Congress can repudiate his actions,
the President will be hesitant to go too far without congressional
cooperation. This situation also adds a dangerous element-if Congress perceives the need to reassert its authority as greater than the
need to present a united front in the international arena, the system may come to an impasse. "In the end, while insisting on its
constitutional autonomy, Congress has generally sensed that in the
strange contraption which the Fathers created for conducting foreign policy, the Congress are the rear wheels, indispensable and
usually obliged to follow, but not without substantial braking
power." 79
Judicial decisions sustaining the validity of executive agreements demonstrate the extent of the executive power in foreign
affairs. Under article II of the Constitution, the President is vested
with important powers, including the power to make treaties, with
the advice and consent of the Senate."' Today, no one seriously
contends, however, that a treaty signed with the advice and consent of the Senate is the exclusive means by which the United
States, under the Constitution, may enter into binding international agreements. 8' Professor Quincy Wright has expressed the
long-prevailing sentiment: "the power to make agreements is
vested in the national government, and apparently the Constitution vests it in two authorities, the President acting alone, and the
President acting with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the
Senate.1 12 The President, relying largely on his powers as "the
Executive"8' 3 and "the Commander-in-Chief,"8' 4 and on his author78. Id. at 123. For example, the President relies on Congress for appropriations to carry out domestic programs.
79. Id.
80. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
81. See McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-ExecutiveorPresidential Agreements: InterchangeableInstruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L.J.
181, 216 (1945).
82. Q. WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 233 (1922). For
an excellent analysis of the historical basis for executive agreements see McDougal & Lans, supra note 81. See generally W. McCLURE, INTERNATIONAL ExEcuTIvE

(1941); Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the
Treaty?, 53 YALE L.J. 664 (1944); Catudal, Executive Agreements: A Supplement
AGREEMENTS

to the Treaty-Making Procedure, 10 GEO. WASH. L. Rxv. 653 (1942).
83. See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 131-63
(1917); McDougal & Lans, supra note 81, at 248-52; N. SMALL, SOME PRESIDENTIAL
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ity to "receive ambassadors"85 and to "take care that the laws be
faithfully executed,"86 has freely negotiated agreements with other
nations. The present inquiry, then, is not whether the President
can enter into executive agreements, but rather, what is the scope
of such agreements.
Although executive power in this area has been practically unbound, it has not gone unchallenged. Early cases dealing with the
President's power to enter into agreements pertained to such matters as annexation of territory, 8 reciprocal trade,8 postal regulation," and jurisdiction.' The challenges to executive agreements
that have had the greatest legal impact are the cases of United
States v. Belmont 2 and United States v. Pink. 3
20-25 (1932); Q. WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF
§ § 151, 209-10, 214-24 (1922).
84. See, e.g., Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424 (1901); C. BERDAHL, THE
WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN THE U.S.
(1921); Gilmore, War
Power-ExecutivePower and the Constitution, 29 IOwA L. REV. 463 (1944); Simpson, Legal Aspects of Executive Agreements, 24 IowA L. REV. 67 (1938); White,
The War Powers of the President, 1943 Wis. L. REv. 205.
85. See E. CORWIN, supra note 25, at 213.
86. See, e.g., In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890), in which Justice Miller stated
that the President's duty is not limited "to the enforcement of the Acts of Congress or of treaties in the United States according to their express terms," but
embraces also "the rights, . . . international relations, and all the protection
implied by the nature of the government under the Constitution." See also
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Todd, The President's
Power to Make InternationalAgreements, 11 CONsT. REV. 160, 165-67 (1927).
87. E. CORWIN, supra note 25, at 213.
88. See Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 700 (1868); Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866).
89. See, e.g. B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912); Field v.
Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); cases cited in McDougal & Lans, supra note 81, at
309 n.8. In the Altman case, the Supreme Court recognized that not all commercial contracts are treaties, saying: "While it may be true that this commercial
agreement, made under authority of the Tariff Act of 1897, § 3, was not a treaty
possessing the dignity of one requiring ratification by the Senate of the U.S., it
was an international compact, negotiated between the representatives of two
sovereign nations and made in the name and on behalf of the contracting countries, and dealing with important commercial relations between the two countries, and was proclaimed by the President. If not technically a treaty requiring
ratification, nevertheless it was a compact authorized by the Congress of the
United States, negotiated and proclaimed under the authority of its President."
224 U.S. at 601.
90. See Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215 (1882); United States v. Eighteen
Packages of Dental Instruments, 222 F. 121 (E.D. Pa. 1915).
91. See, e.g., Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424 (1902).
92. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PRESIDENCY
AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS
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Both Belmont and Pink were concerned with the United States
recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933. The statement of recognition included the Litvinov Agreement, under which the Soviet
Union assigned to the United States all claims it had against funds
located in the United States in exchange for the release of all
United States claims arising out of the Soviet nationalizations. In
Belmont, the issue was whether funds deposited by a Russian corporation in a New York bank prior to 1918 were subject to the
Agreement. The New York courts refused to recognize the extraterritorial effect of the nationalizations since these violated New York
public policy. The courts found that the Soviet Union did not have
a valid claim to funds which it could assign to the United States.
Therefore, the courts held that the funds were not subject to the
Agreement and denied the United States claim to the funds. The
Supreme Court found that in connection with the President's independent power to receive ambassadors, which includes the power
to recognize governments, he is authorized to take whatever steps
are necessary to carry out this function. The recognition, the establishment of diplomatic relations, and the assignment were found
to be part of one transaction, which resulted in international compacts that did not require the advice and consent of the Senate.
Therefore, since the Litvinov Agreement was a necessary part of
the conduct of foreign relations, it prevailed over New York public
policy. "In respect of all international negotiations and compacts,
and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes the state of New York does not exist."94
This position was reaffirmed in United States v. Pink. A Russian
insurance company had established a branch in New York in 1907,
but the branch discontinued operations in 1925. The Superintendent of Insurance of New York took possession of its assets and
settled claims with domestic creditors. The United States brought
suit under the Litvinov Agreement to recover the remaining assets
after New York state courts had ordered that the funds be distributed to foreign creditors and then to the former directors of the
93. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). The first implied recognition
by the Supreme Court that the President has power to make executive agreements occurred in the earlier case of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934),
in which Chief Justice Hughes stated: "The National Government, by virtue of
its control of our foreign relations is entitled to employ the resources of diplomatic
negotiations and to effect such an international settlement as may be found to
be appropriate, through treaty, agreement, or other wise." 292 U.S. at 331 (emphasis added).
94. 301 U.S. at 331.
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Russian company who had immigrated to France. The Supreme
Court found that the Litvinov Agreement was necessary to normalize relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Since the Agreement was a prerequisite to recognition, New York
could not interfere with the establishment of friendly relations by
reinjecting some of the irritants that had hindered relations. The
executive agreements in question were held to cancel the rights of
the foreign creditors under New York law as a result of the power
of the national government over foreign affairs, including the executive's authority to recognize governments.
The Belmont and Pink cases, then, recognize that the President
can act constitutionally when making international agreements
despite the absence of congressional participation. The executive
agreement rests on a more solid ground when the President and
Congress work to achieve the same end-that is, when legislation
has expressly authorized the President's action. Thus in Star-Kist
Foods,Inc. v. United States,9 5 the court upheld an executive agreement that had been negotiated pursuant to section 350(a) of the
Trade Agreements Act of 1934.96 An American producer of canned
tuna contended that the trade agreement with Iceland, which reduced tariffs on certain imported tuna, was void because it had not
received the advice and consent of the Senate. In sustaining the
executive agreement in question, the court stated:
From reading the act, it is apparent that Congress concluded that
the promotion of foreign trade required that the tariff barriers in this
and other countries be modified on a negotiated basis. Since the
President has the responsibility of conducting the foreign affairs of
this country generally, it gave to him the added responsibility of
negotiating the agreements in pursuance of the spirit of the act.97
The court then relied on the opinions in Curtiss-Wright, Belmont
and Pink in holding that the executive agreement with Iceland and
the accompanying proclamation were valid.
Therefore, when the President enters an international agreement
pursuant to an explicit legislative authorization, as in Star-Kist,
his action has firm constitutional underpinnings. When the President takes measures that are at odds with clear congressional mandates, however, his authority is extremely weak, as noted above in
95. 275 F.2d 472 (C.C.P.A. 1959).
96. 48 Stat. 943 (1934), amending 46 Stat. 590 (1930).
97. 275 F.2d at 483. The court also quoted a passage from B. Altman & Co.
v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912).
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Guy W. Capps. The resolution of this issue is more difficult when
there is no legislation on point.
Ill.

DELEGATION OF TARIFF REGULATION.

Under the powers "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and
excises" and "to regulate commerce with foreign nations,"' 8 Congress historically has maintained legislative authority over the entire field of foreign trade regulation." Pursuant to these constitutional mandates, Congress has passed a number of acts that have
delegated foreign commerce powers to the President. The early
statutes usually gave to the Executive the authority to alter tariff
rates, to lay or lift embargoes or to close ports to vessels of particular nations whenever the commerce of the United States would be
benefited thereby.
The Act of June 4, 1794, was the earliest important legislative
act that gave to the executive branch power in the area of foreign
trade. The Act authorized the President to lay, regulate and revoke
embargoes, whenever, in his opinion, the safety of the public so
required. Specifically, he was authorized "to lay the embargo on
all ships and vessels in the ports of the United States, or upon the
ships and vessels of the United States, or the ships and vessels of
any foreign nation, under such regulations as the circumstances of
the case may require, and to continue or revoke the same, whenever he shall think proper." ' Of significance are the proviso to this
section of the Act that prevented the President from exercising the
delegated authority when the Congress was not in session, and the
short duration of the power granted by the Act. 01
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
99. This power has been unchallenged in the courts except in the context of
regulation of state action that would infringe on commerce. The power is deemed
inherent in a sovereign and has been held to lie in Congress whether or not
sanctioned by the Constitution. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 755, 75758 (1948); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-18
(1936); Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 73, 86 (1875); Penhallow v. Doane,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54 (1795). See Bassiouni & Landau, PresidentialDiscretion in
Foreign Trade and Its Effect on East-West Trade, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 494, 495-96
(1968).
100. Act of June 4, 1794, ch. 41, § 1, 1 Stat. 372.
101. The Act provided that the embargo would automatically terminate fifteen days after Congress was back in session, and that the Act itself was to last
only up to the following session of Congress. A prior joint resolution of May 7,
1794, had conferred unqualified power on the President to grant clearances, not
withstanding an existing embargo, to ships or vessels belonging to citizens of the
United States bound for any port beyond the Cape of Good Hope. S.J. Res. 5, 3d
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Tariff regulation is perhaps the most significant aspect of foreign
commerce over which the President has been delegated great
power. 02 Prior to 1934, Congress imposed tariffs and other restrictions on imports, subject only to the limited influence of the President's power of persuasion and the threat of his possible veto of
legislation.0 3 The Executive did attempt to enter into a number of
agreements with other countries for reciprocal reductions in customs duties, but most of these attempts were frustrated in the
Senate.' 04
The initial step toward providing the Executive with advance
authority to implement tariff concessions granted under trade
agreements was made in the Tariff Act of 1890.05 To secure reciprocal trade with countries producing certain articles, the President
was authorized whenever he found that countries exporting these
articles were imposing on them duties or other exactions that he
deemed to be "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable," to suspend
for such time as he deemed just the provisions of the Act relating
to the free introduction of such articles.
The Tariff Act of 1897,10° typical of the early tariff acts, was a
revenue statute designed to "provide revenue for the Government
and to encourage the industries of the United States." The Act
permitted the President to proclaim specified duty reductions on
a limited number of items in return for equivalent concessions
granted by the parties importing those items.' 1 Nine agreements
Cong., 1st Sess., 1 Stat. 401 (1794). See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 322 (1936). Similarly, the President has been given broad
authority to suspend embargo legislation if the suspension of hostilities abroad
has rendered United States commerce sufficiently safe. See, e.g., Act of April 22,
1808, ch. 52, 2 Stat. 490. Congress also has passed a number of acts laying tonnage
and other duties on foreign ships in retaliation for duties enforced against United
States vessels. The President, however, was authorized to suspend the duties
whenever he was satisfied that the countervailing duty was repealed or abolished.
See, e.g., Act of January 7, 1824, ch. 4, § 4, 4 Stat. 3.
102. See generally F. TAuSSIG, TARIFF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATEs (1923).
103. K. MACKENZIE, supra note 7, at 1.
104. An agreement negotiated with the German Customs Union in 1844 was
brought before the Senate as a treaty but failed to receive the necessary twothirds majority. Although most of the other attempts to implement trade treaties
met a similar fate, the 1875 treaty with Hawaii and the 1902 treaty with Cuba
were successfully concluded. K. MACKENZIE, supra note 7, at 2.
105. Act of October 1, 1890, ch. 1244; § 3, 26 Stat. 567.
106. Act of July 24, 1897, ch. 11, § 3, 30 Stat. 151, 203.
107. Section 4 of the Act contemplated duty reductions of up to twenty per
cent on items in the tariff generally. Agreements under § 4 required both Senate
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were put into effect under the Act and remained in force until
terminated by the Act of 1909.I' s Although these statutes delegated

to the President increased authority in the area of foreign trade,
the Executive in the first quarter of the twentieth century still was
limited by the historical congressional preemption in this field.
Thus, in 1914, President Wilson, faced with strong pressure from
Great Britain as a result of his Mexican policy, found it necessary
to go before Congress to urge repeal of the Panama Canal Act of
1911 (which imposed tolls on the Panama Canal).' 9
I ask this of you in support of the foreign policy of the Administra-

tion. I shall not know how to deal with other matters of even greater
delicacy and nearer consequences if you do not grant it to me in
ungrudging measure."10
It has been suggested that "[n]o more striking acknowledgement
has ever been made by a President of the actual power of Congress
in the foreign relations field.""'
In the 1920's and early 1930's, tariffs rose to unprecedented levels. The high tariffs provided for by the Fordney-McCumber Tariff
Act of 192212 reflected the post-War sentiment toward isolationism, nationalism and peace at any price."' Under the Act, if the
President found that the duties fixed in the Act did not equalize
the differences in costs of production between United States goods
and the like goods of competing foreign nations, he was empowered
to adjust rates of duty up to fifty percent to equalize the costs of
production." 4 The Act, moreover, was viewed as an emergency
measure:
ratification and congressional approval and, therefore, did not enhance the powers that the President already had.
108. Act of June 29, 1909, ch. 1, § 4, 36 Stat. 1, 83. See K. MACKENZIE, supra
note 7, at 2 & n.6.
109. Ch. 390, § 5, 37 Stat. 560.
110. Message of March 5, 1914, quoted in E. CORWIN, supra note 25, at 191.
111. E. CORWIN, supra note 25, at 191. Another factor that may have influenced President Wilson's admission of preeminent congressional power in this
area was the recently passed Underwood Tariff Act of 1913, which gave the President the authority to negotiate trade agreements, but which required such agreements to be submitted to Congress (not just the Senate, as in the case of a treaty)
for ratification or rejection. Act of October 3, 1913, ch. 16, § 4, 38 Stat. 114, 192.
112. Ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858. As to the Act's requirement of a hearing see Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933); 33 COLUM.
L. REv. 528-29 (1933); 81 U. PA. L. Rnv. 764-65 (1933).
113. See I C. HULL, THE MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL 124 (1948).
114. Ch. 356, § 315, 42 Stat. 941.
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Whenever the President shall by proclamation declare an emergency to exist by reason of a state of war, or otherwise, he may
authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to extend during the continuance of such emergency the time herein prescribed for the performance of any act."-'
Rising prices and inflationary conditions in the United States
market precipitated an even more drastic congressional measure in
1930. Hearings began in the spring of 1929116 on the bill that a year
later became the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act."7 The majority members of the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate
Finance Committee initially wrote the tariff bill to suit their own
local and regional interests."' The new Act was envisioned largely
as an accommodation to farm interests, who sought increased tariff
protection against agricultural imports. A great deal of logrolling"' provided something for almost everyone through a proliferation of protectionist amendments, owing largely to the stock
market crash in the fall of 1929 and the consequent decline of
economic activity early in 1930.120 The 1930 Act specifically
granted to the President the authority to impose higher tariffs on
imports. Unlike previous provisions, section 338 of the Act' 2'
115. Ch. 356, § 622, 42 Stat. 988.
116. Hearings on H.R. 2067 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
70th Cong., 2d Sess., (1929); Hearings on H.R. 2067 Before a Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., (1929).
117. Ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (1930), as amended, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1654 (1970).
118. See K. MACKENZIE, supra note 7, at 2-3.
119. Cordell Hull, at that time a member of the House of Representatives and
an outspoken opponent of high tariffs, wrote that he himself saw many instances
of log-rolling among members of Congress. For instance, Senator Grundy of Pennsylvania "was open and avowed in his methods, stating in effect that the interests
which put up the money for campaigns should be compensated in this way by
high tariffs." I C. HuLL, supra note 113, at 132.
120. See Metzger, The Escape Clause and Adjustment Assistance: Proposals
and Assessments, 2 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 352 (1970).
121. Section 338 of the Act (ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590, 704 (1930), as amended, 19
U.S.C. § 1338 (1970)) provides, in pertinent part: "(a) Additional duties.-The
President when he finds that the public interest will be served shall by proclamation specify and declare new or additional duties as hereinafter provided upon
articles wholly or in part the growth or product of, or imported in a vessel of, any
foreign country whenever he shall find as a fact that such country"(1) Imposes, directly or indirectly, upon the disposition in or transportation
in transit through or reexportation from such country of any article wholly or in
part the growth or product of the United States any unreasonable charge, exaction, regulation, or limitation which is not equally enforced upon the like articles
of every foreign country; or
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reached "unreasonable" as well as "unjustifiable" restrictions on
commerce, but it was more clearly limited to those restrictions that
discriminated in the sense of placing domestic commerce at a disadvantage compared with that of any third country. Section 338
directed the President to retaliate against such discrimination by
imposing countervailing import duties. If this form of retaliation
proved ineffective, the President was authorized, in his discretion,
to refuse entry to articles produced in the offending country or
transported in its vessel. 2 '
The Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930 was a disastrous piece of legislation. As one writer has observed, the Act was "the outstanding
example of Congressional tariff-making at its worst."' 23 Thirty-four
nations protested the passage of the Act, and many retaliated by
enacting their own high-tariff legislation.1"4 Coupled with the general economic collapse, the adverse effect on United States commerce was overwhelming. Trade was being adjusted worldwide,
and the United States was losing out in every respect. In 1929, the
United States share of the world's foreign trade was 13.8 percent;
by 1933 it had fallen to 9.9 percent. All domestic exports declined
appreciably. 2 1 Consequently, drastic steps were needed to improve
the United States position in the international commercial market.
A.

The Trade Agreements Act of 1934

Congress responded to the prevailing commercial crisis by enacting the Trade Agreements Act of 1934,121 the principal purpose of
"(2) Discriminates in fact against the commerce of the United States, directly
or indirectly, by law or administrative regulation or practice, by or in respect to
any customs, tonnage, or port duty, fee, charge, exaction, classification, regulation, condition, restriction, or prohibition, in such manner as to place the commerce of the United States at a disadvantage compared with the commerce of any
foreign country."
122. 46 Stat. 704 (1930), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1383 (1970). See Matthews,
Non-tariff Import Restrictions: Remedies Available in United States Law, 62
MICH. L. REV. 1295, 1342-43 (1964).
123. K. MACKENZIE, supra note 7, at 2.
124. See I C. HULL, supra note 113, at 355.
125. Id. at 354, 357. See BuREAu OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COMMERCE, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN COMMERCE YEARBOOK 1935,

at 373;

SENATE COMM.

ON FINANCE, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN TRADE OF THE UNITED STATES IN RELATION TO S. Doc. No. 180, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 (1933); Metzger, supra note

120, at 354; Message by President Roosevelt to Congress, Mar. 2, 1934, in H.R.
Doc. No. 273, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
126. An Act to Amend the Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943 (1934),
amending 46 Stat. 590 (1930). Pertinent sections thereof are as follows: "Sec. 350.
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which was to expand United States exports. Although the Act was
an amendment to the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, it is fully
effective and operates independently in the same way as a separate
enactment. 27 Two features of the Act are important for the purposes of the present discussion: first, the President could reduce
(a) For the purpose of expanding foreign markets for the products of the United
States (as a means of assisting in the present emergency in restoring the American
standard of living, in overcoming domestic unemployment and the present economic depression, in increasing the purchasing power of the American public, and
in establishing and maintaining a better relationship among various branches of
American agriculture, industry, mining, and commerce) by regulating the admission of foreign goods into the United States in accordance with the characteristics
and needs of various branches of American production so that foreign markets will
be made available to those branches of American production which require and
are capable of developing such outlets by affording corresponding market opportunities for foreign products in the United States, the President, whenever he
finds as a fact that any existing duties or other import restrictions of the United
States or any foreign country are unduly burdening and restricting the foreign
trade of the United States and that the purpose above declared will be promoted
by the means hereinafter specified, is authorized from time to time- (1) to enter
into foreign trade agreements with foreign governments or instrumentalities
thereof; and (2) to proclaim such modifications of existing duties and other import restrictions, or such additional import restrictions, or such continuance, and
for such minimum periods, of existing customs or excise treatment of any article
covered by foreign trade agreements, as are required or appropriate to carry out
any foreign trade agreement that the President has entered into hereunder. No
proclamation shall be made increasing or decreasing by more than 50 per centum
any existing rate of duty or transferring any article between the dutiable and free
lists. The proclaimed duties and other import restrictions shall apply to articles
the growth, produce, or manufacture of all foreign countries, whether imported
directly, or indirectly: Provided, That the President may suspend the application
to articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of any country because of its
discriminatory treatment of American commerce or because of other acts or policies which in his opinion tend to defeat the purposes set forth in this section; and
the proclaimed duties and other import restrictions shall be in effect from and
after such time as is specified in the proclamation. The President may at any time
terminate any such proclamation in whole or in part.
Sec. 2.. . . (b) Every foreign trade agreement concluded pursuant to this Act
shall be subject to termination, upon due notice to the foreign government concerned, at the end of not more than three years from the date on which the
agreement comes into force, and if not then terminated, shall be subject to termination thereafter upon not more than six months' notice."
127. Cordell Hull, who became Secretary of State in 1933, felt that "it would
have been folly to go to Congress and ask that the Smoot-Hawley Act be repealed
or its rates reduced by Congress. This had been the old system; and, with the
exception of the Underwood Act in 1913, it always resulted in higher tariffs because the special interests enriched by high tariffs went to their respective Congressmen and insisted on higher rates." I C. HULL, supra note 113, at 358.
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tariffs by as much as fifty percent for countries that did not discriminate against the United States; and secondly, the President
was given the authority to negotiate trade agreements without
Senate approval.
The first feature is the so-called "unconditional most-favorednation clause."' 28 As it pertains to tariff reductions it means that
when the United States reduces the tariff rates on certain articles
imported from country A the rates are likewise reduced on the
same articles imported from countries B to Z - provided, however,
that countries B to Z afford United States exports the same low
rates of duty and as much freedom from restrictions as they allow
any other country. If country B put higher rates of duty or more
restrictions on United States products than on goods coming into
B from any other country, then B's exports to the United States
would still incur the high Smoot-Hawley rates.'2 9 Thus application
of the most-favored-nation principle affords a means by which to
achieve substantial tariff reductions, while at the same time it
allows the President discretion in the application of the principle
to nations that discriminate against the United States.
Secondly, the 1934 Act shifted the tariff-making function from
Congress to the executive branch. 13 Formerly, trade agreements
were in the form of treaties, which had to be submitted for Senate
approval. Due to the prevailing congressional sentiment, however,
128. The most-favored-nation principle has been a historic trade policy of the
United States. Originally, it was applied in a conditional form-i.e. countries
accorded the most-favored-nation treatment were entitled to the benefits of trade
agreements between the United States and other countries only if they gave
equivalent compensation for the benefits received. The change to unconditional
most-favored-nation treatment, which automatically extends trade agreement
benefits to third countries without requiring compensation, was made by the
Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858 (1922), after the conditional
policy became increasingly ineffective in protecting American exports abroad. See
2 G. HACKWORTH,DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 57-61 (1941); J. JACKSON, WORLD
TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 249-72 (1969); K. MACKENZIE, supra note 7, at 41.
See generally E. LUDWIG, COMMENTS ON THE MOST-FAvORED-NATION CLAUSE
(1913); R. SNYDER, THE MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSE (1948).
129. See I C. HULL, supra note 113, at 359-60. Applying the conditional mostfavored-nation treatment under the same situation would mean that, when the
United States made a tariff treaty with country A, she did not apply her tariff
reductions to countries B to Z unless countries B to Z agreed to give to the United
States concessions equivalent to those given to the United States by country A.
For the reasons for the failure of the conditional form see id. at 360-61.
130. K. MACKENZIE, supra note 7, at 3. The Act based this delegation of authority on the existence of an emergency and the need of reviving United States
foreign trade. See Stowell, Editorial Comment,29 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1935).
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treaties containing substantial tariff reductions were hopeless tools
to effect trade agreements. Other nations hesitated to negotiate
trade agreements because they were aware of the Senate's adverse
actions regarding tariff-reducing treaties. 3 ' Many other nations
could raise or lower tariff rates by executive order and thus could
negotiate agreements without cumbersome legislative involvement. What the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 did, then, was to
free the hand of the President to negotiate trade agreements with
other nations without having to ask the Senate for prior or subsequent approval,132 thereby establishing the pattern of the present
foreign trade policy.'33
B. Post-1934 Legislation
As an emergency relief measure, the Trade Agreements Act of
1934 was designed to improve the depressed conditions of the
United States economy through an expansion of exports. Although
the Act contemplated reciprocal cuts in United States customs
duties in return for foreign tariff reductions, which would encourage exports, the proponents of the legislation made it clear that no
American industries would be sacrificed in the process. 34 President
Roosevelt emphasized this point in his message to Congress that
accompanied the Trade Agreements Bill:
The exercise of the authority which I propose must be carefully
weighed in the light of the latest information so as to give assurance
that no sound and important American interest will be seriously
disturbed. The adjustment of our foreign trade relations must rest
on the promise
of undertaking to benefit and not to injure such
3
interests.'

5

Industries concerned about injury from imports, nevertheless,
were dissatisfied. Despite the assurances emanating from the legis131. See I C. HULL, supra note 113, at 354-55.
132. Proposed amendments to the 1934 Act suggested that Congress should
retain some type of approval function as provided for in effecting treaties. For
instance, Senator Johnson of California proposed that "no foreign trade agreement entered into under the provisions of the act shall become effective until
submitted to the Congress by the President and approved by both the House and
the Senate by majority vote .....

This proposal was defeated (by a vote of 50-

34); similar proposals met the same fate. S. JOUR. 492, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (May
28, 1934).
133. For an account of the machinery that was set up to execute the 1934 Act
see I C. HULL, supra note 113, at 366-77.
134. See K. MACKENZIE, supra note 7, at 73-74.
135. 78 CONG. REC. 5256 (1934) (remarks of Representative Doughton).

Winter, 1973

THE IMPORT SURCHARGE OF 1971

lative and executive branches, industries feared that the trade
concessions, once negotiated, might bring about an increase in
imports, thereby threatening serious injury to the competing domestic industry. Accordingly, an "escape clause" was inserted at
the request of the United States in the bilateral trade agreement
with Mexico in 1942.136 The clause provided that a concession could
be suspended or modified if increased imports resulting therefrom
caused serious injury to a domestic industry.
While escape clauses were to be incorporated into future trade
agreements, no formal procedures were available to private parties
to petition for relief.1 7 In response to congressional pressure to
remedy this alleged defect, a 1947 Executive Order ' required the
Tariff Commission to investigate whether "as a result of unforeseen developments and of the concession granted on any article by
the United States . . ., such article is being imported in such

increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or
threaten serious injury."'39 If injury was found, a recommendation
of remedial action, in the form of withdrawal or modification of the
concession, was to be made to the President. 4 '
Despite attempts by the Executive to assuage the industrial
136. Agreement with Mexico Respecting Reciprocal Trade, Dec. 23, 1942, 57
Stat. 833 (1943), E.A.S. No. 311 (effective Jan. 30, 1943). See Metzger, supra note
120, at 356-57.
137. Although Congress extended the President's authority under § 350 of the
1930 Act (as amended by the 1934 Act) for a further three-year period, there was
no specific inclusion of an "escape clause." Act of July 5, 1945, ch. 269, § 350, 59
Stat. 410. The Act of 1945 did, however, authorize further reductions in tariffs
by permitting the Executive to reduce duties by 50% of the rates effective on
January 1, 1945, which meant that a duty that had been reduced by 50% could
be further reduced by another 50% in a trade agreement.
138. Exec. Order No. 9832, 3 C.F.R. 624 (1943-1948 Comp.). At this same time
preparations were being made for the negotiation of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Article XIX of GATT contains an escape clause
provision (61 Stat. A58). See generally J. JACKSON, supra note 128.
139. Exec. Order No. 9832, 3 C.F.R. 624 (1943-1948 Comp.) This policy of
precautionary review prior to trade agreement negotiation was later codified and
made more restrictive by § 3 of the 1951 Trade Agreements Extention Act, ch.
141, § 3, 65 Stat. 73, the so-called "peril points" provision. See note 152 infra and
accompanying text.
140. Exercising its discretion, the Commission dismissed fourteen of the seventeen applications processed under the Executive Order without a formal investigation, and it found serious injury in only one case. Kelly, The "Expanded"
Trade-Agreements Escape Clause 1955-61, 70 J. POL. ECON. 37, 41 (1962). See
U.S. TARIFF COMM'N, Pub. No. 116, INVESTIGATIONS UNDER THE EsCAPE CLAUSE OF
TRADE AGREEMENTS 8-12 (15th ed. 1963).
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uneasiness over the new tariff policy, dissatisfaction with the operation of the escape clause continued. Relief was not immediately
in sight, however, since post-war conditions necessitated even
more stringent controls. The 1945 Act gave the President the power
to raise tariffs by fifty per cent. 4' Drastic wartime controls over
exports were continued each year after World War II until February 28, 1949, when the Export Control Act' was enacted as the
first comprehensive system of export controls ever adopted by Congress in peacetime.' Congress stated the policy of the Act as follows:
Sec. 2. The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of the
United States to use export controls to the extent necessary (a) to
protect the domestic economy from the excessive drain of scarce
materials and to reduce the inflationary impact of abnormal foreign
demand; (b) to further the foreign policy of the United States and
to aid in fulfilling its international responsibilities; and (c) to exercise the necessary vigilance over exports from the standpoint of their
significance to the national security.'
To effectuate this policy the President was given the broad

power to prohibit or curtail the exportation from the United States
of any articles, materials or supplies, including technical data.'
141. Act of July 5, 1945, ch. 269, § 2, 59 Stat. 410.
142. Ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7 (1949), as amended, 50 U.S.C. APP. §§ 2021-32 (1964)
(expired on December 31, 1961, and now covered by 50 U.S.C. APP. §§ 2401-13
(1970)).
143. Since certain materials (steel, chemicals, drugs and building supplies)
continued in short supply at home and abroad, unrestricted exports of such materials without regard to the potential economic impact could have adversely affected national security. Congress, therefore, deemed it necessary to impose strict
controls on exports. See Berman & Garson, United States Export Control-Past,
Present, and Future, 67 COLUM. L. Rlv. 791 & n.1 (1967).
144. Shortly after the passage of the Act, a coordinating committee (CoCom)
was formed with other nations for the purpose of cooperating on a list of items
that the member nations would not export to Communist nations. Member nations first consisted of the United States, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey,
United Kingdom, and West Germany. See Bassiouni & Landau, supra note 99,
at 510. Despite CoCom, many items still were exported by other friendly nations
to the Sino-Soviet bloc. S. REP. No. 1287, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), 1960 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2011-12. Congress felt that this problem could be resolved in part by stating a policy (to be implemented by the President) of widening the coordination of prohibitions to include these other friendly countries. See
S. REP. No. 1576, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 511 & n.95 (1962).
145. 50 U.S.C. APP. § 2023(a) (1964) (now embodied in 50 U.S.C. APP. § 2403
(1970)). The constitutionality of this broad delegation has never been challenged.

Winter, 1973

THE IMPORT SURCHARGE OF 1971

The Act also authorized the President to redelegate the power
given to him,' which the President did in 1961.11 It has been said
that no other prior single piece of legislation gave more power to
the President to control United States commerce than the Export
Control Act of 1949.48 Subject only to the vague standards of "for-

eign policy" and "national security and welfare," he was given
authority to cut off the entire export trade of the United States or
to deny "export privileges" to any person. Additionally, the procedures for implementing this power were left almost entirely to his
discretion, and at the same time serious administrative and criminal sanctions could be imposed for violation of any export regulations he might introduce.'
The President's authority under the Export Control Act was
renewed in seven subsequent legislative approvals,"' but perhaps
the most significant was the initial renewal by the Trade AgreeVirtually identical delegations under earlier acts of this type, however, were upheld in United States v. Rosenburg, 47 F. Supp. 406 (E.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd, 150
F.2d 788 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 752 (1945), and in United States v.
Bereno, 50 F. Supp. 520 (D. Md. 1943). See Bassiouni & Landau, supra note 99,
at 502-03, 512.
146. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2023(b) (1964) (now embodied in 50 U.S.C. App.
§ 2403(d) (1970)).
147. The President redelegated his power to the Secretary of Commerce by
Exec. Order No. 10,945, 3 C.F.R. 473 (1959-63 Comp.), 50 U.S.C. App. § 2023
(1964).
148. Berman & Garson, supra note 143, at 792.
149. Under the Act, the President could regulate all exports from the United
States regardless of destination. Moreover, he could invoke the Trading with the
Enemy Act of 1917 against designated "countries. Ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411, as
amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-44 (1970). The amended Act was employed by the
President in December 1950, following the entrance of foreign forces into Korea,
as the basis for the issuance of regulations designed to prevent virtually all economic dealings (including imports and financial transactions, as well as exports)
with Communist China and North Korea. See Berman & Garson, supra note 143,
at 792-93.
150. The Export Control Act was renewed in the years 1951, 1953, 1956, 1958,
1960, 1962 and 1965. In 1969, however, Congress did not renew the Act, per se,
but embodied a major portion of the substance of the Act in the Export Administration Act of 1969, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-13 (1970). From 1945, which marked
the legislative highpoint of the trade liberalization program (see note 137 supra),
until 1962, extensions of the tariff-cutting power were modest. The 1955 Act
authorized fifteen per cent reductions. Act of June 21, 1955, ch. 169, 69 Stat. 162.
The 1958 Act, which authorized twenty per cent reductions, extended until June
30, 1962, the period during which the President was authorized to enter trade
agreements with foreign countries. Act of August 20, 1958, 72 Stat. 673.
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ments Extension Act of 1951.'1' Under the 1951 Act, which was an

extension of the authority given to the President under the Tariff
Act of 1930, the President was required to submit any proposed
foreign trade agreement to the Tariff Commission. The Commission was required to investigate the President's list of articles
"imported into the United States to be considered for possible
modifications of duties and other import restrictions, imposition of
additional import restrictions, or continuance of existing customs
or excise treatment." The Commission was then to report to the
President its findings for each such article on:
(1) The limit to which such modification, imposition, or continuance may be extended in order to carry out the purpose of such
section 350 [of the Tariff Act of 1930] without causing or threatening serious injury to the domestic industry producing like or directly
competitive articles; and (2) if increases in duties or additional import restrictions are required to avoid serious injury to the domestic
industry producing like or directly competitive articles the
minimum increases in duties or additional import restrictions required (emphasis added).'-"

The italicized words in the above-quoted section of the Act have
been construed to constitute so-called "peril points." In other
words, the Tariff Commission would provide the President with its
educated guess concerning the lowest possible noninjurious
rate-the "limit" or "minimum"-on each separate article on the
President's list. This called for the Commission to forecast the
effect of duty reductions on thousands of articles. The President,
in subsequent trade negotiations, might breach these "peril
points," but would then have to report his reasons for so doing to
Congress. Determination of the peril points became such an onerous task that they were not included in the statutory scheme of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962.13
151. Act of June 16, 1951, ch. 141, 65 Stat. 72, as amended, Trade Expansion
Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991 (1970).
152. As under prior law, the Commission was required to hold hearings before
it made its final report to the President. The Commission's report was to be sent
to the President not later than 120 days after the Commission received the list
from the President. The President could make no foreign trade agreements until
the Commission had made its report to the President or until the expiration of
the 120-day period. Act of June 16, 1951, § 3(a)(2), ch. 141, 65 Stat. 72. See
Metzger, supra note 120, at 356-57.
153. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991 (1970). See notes 156-60 infra and accompanying
text.
Winter, 1973

THE IMPORT SURCHARGE OF 1971

C.

The Trade Expansion Act of 1962.

On January 25, 1962, President Kennedy sent to Congress his
message concerning the trade agreements program. The President
requested extensive new tariff-cutting authority, citing five new
developments to support his request: (1) the growth of the European Common Market; (2) the growing pressures on the United
States balance of payments; (3) the need to accelerate economic
growth; (4) the Communist aid and trade offensive; and (5) the
need for new markets for developing nations." 4 The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (TEA), responding to these developments, made
three significant changes in the existing legislation:
(1) it expanded substantially the authority of the President to negotiate tariff reductions in trade agreements, with Common Market
countries and with others; (2) it changed materially the 'safeguards
against injury' provisions of the program; (3) it added an 'adjustment assistance' program to firms and employees harmed by imports, to be used in place of or in combination with tariff relief. 55
Section 201 of the Act provides the basic authority for trade
agreements. Under this section the President was authorized to
enter trade agreements that could decrease the rate of duty to a
rate 50 per cent below the rate existing on July 1, 1962, or increase
the rate no more than 50 per cent above the rate existing on July
1, 1934. This power expired on July 1, 1967,156 and has not been
renewed. Section 211 sets forth specific provisions pertaining to the
European Economic Community (EEC). If the President determines that the United States and the countries of the EEC together account for 80 per cent or more of the aggregate world export
15
value of the articles in any category, he can eliminate the duty.
The most significant aspect of these provisions is that they allow
for across-the-board reductions, as opposed to the item-by-item
negotiations under the Trade Agreements Act. 58 Moreover, specific peril points were eliminated.155 Another important change was
the major modification in the escape clause proceedings.16
The TEA also enlarged the scope of the President's power to
154. S. METZGER, TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE KENNEDY ROUND 1-10 (1964).
155. Id. at 19.
156. 19 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) (1970).
157. 19 U.S.C. § 1831 (1970).
158. S. METZGER, supra note 154, at 20.
159. Id. at 23. See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
160. S. METZGER, supra note 154, at 44-54.
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suspend the operation of a concession granted under a trade agreement. Section 350(a) (5)111 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act
authorized the President to suspend the application of any trade
agreement to articles of any country discriminating against United
States commerce or maintaining policies that tend to defeat the
purpose of the Act. Subsection (a) (6) provides that "[tihe President may at any time terminate, in whole or in part, any proclamation made pursuant to this section. 1 1 2 Section 350(a) (6) remains
in effect and is repeated in section 255(b)' 3 of the TEA. Section
350(a) (5), however, was repealed by section 257(b)' 64 of the TEA.
Section 252(c) currently provides for retaliation in response to
"unreasonable import restrictions which either directly or indiIt
),,65
rectly substantially burden United States commerce ....
has been suggested that the expanded scope of section 252 evidences a congressional desire "that the President make greater use
of this retaliatory tool than in past years in order to end discrimination or 'unreasonable' or 'unjustifiable' treatment of American
exports"'6 6 and that this change is an expression of concern over
the impact of the Common Market on American agricultural exports.'
161. Act of June 21, 1955, ch. 169, § 3(a)(4), 69 Stat. 164: "Subject to the
provisions of section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 (19 U.S.C.,
sec. 1367) [Suspension or withdrawal of concessions from Communistic areas],
duties and other import restrictions proclaimed pursuant to this section shall
apply to articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of all foreign countries,
whether imported directly or indirectly: Provided, that the President shall, as
soon as practicable, suspend the application to articles the growth, produce, or
manufacture of any country because of its discriminatory treatment of American
commerce or because of other acts (including the operations of international
cartels) or policies which in his opinion tend to defeat the purpose of this section."
162. 19 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(6) (1970).
163. 19 U.S.C. § 1885(b) (1970).
164. Act of October 11, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 257(b), 76 Stat. 882.
165. 19 U.S.C. § 1882(c) (1970): "Whenever a foreign country or instrumentality, the products of which receive benefits of trade agreement concessions made
by the United States, maintains unreasonable import restrictions which either
directly or indirectly substantially burden United States commerce, the President
may, to the extent that such action is consistent with the purposes of section 1801
of this title, and having due regard for the international obligations of the United
States-(l) suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of benefits of trade
agreement concessions to products of such country or instrumentality, or (2)
refrain from proclaiming benefits of trade agreement concessions to carry out a
trade agreement with such country or instrumentality."
166. S. METZGER, supra note 154, at 32.
167. Id. at 36-37. For an example of this impact see Walker, Dispute Settlement: The Chicken War, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 671 (1964).
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Two other provisions authorize the President to increase tariffs.
Section 301,168 the escape clause, provides that a trade association,
firm or union may petition the Tariff Commission for tariff adjustment. The President may grant the adjustment if the Tariff Commission finds that increased imports cause, or threaten to cause,
serious injury to the domestic industry producing an article that
is directly competitive with the imported article, and that the
increased imports have been the major factor in causing or threatening to cause the injury. 69' Section 232170 also permits the President to restrict imports when he deems there is a threat to the
national security. There are no material differences between this
17
section and prior law. '
An additional provision was included by the Senate Finance
Committee in reporting the bill. Section 353 would have authorized the President, if he found it to be in the national interest, to
proclaim the increase of any existing duty to such rate as he might
have found necessary. Moreover, this proposed section would have
allowed the imposition of duties on items not otherwise subject to
duty and the imposition of quotas or other import restrictions as
the President might have found necessary. 72 Section 353 was included in the Senate version of the bill. This provision, however,
73
was withdrawn by the Senate in the conference committee.'
IV.

THE IMPORT SURCHARGE OF

1971

On August 15, 1971, President Nixon announced the New Economic Plan, which comprised a series of proposals to combat inflation and improve the United States balance of payments problems.
The President imposed a 90-day wage and price freeze, temporarily
suspended the convertibility of dollars into gold or other reserve
assets, and proclaimed the ten per cent import surcharge. 7 4 The
authority to impose the wage and price freeze had been delegated
to the President in the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970. ' 75 In
Presidential Proclamation No. 4074, proclaiming the surcharge, it
168. 19 U.S.C. § 1901 (1970).
169. 19 U.S.C. § 1902 (1970).
170. 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1970).
171. S. METZGER, supra note 154, at 39.
172. S. REP. No. 2059, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1962).
173. H.R. REP. No. 2518, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1962).
174. For the full text of the President's address see N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1971,
at 14, col. 1.
175. Pub. L. No. 91-379, tit. I, 84 Stat. 799 (1970).
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was noted that the President had entered various trade agreements
and proclaimed tariff rates under them pursuant to the authority
vested in the Executive "by the Constitution and the statutes,
including, but not limited to, the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended,
and the Trade Expansion Act of 1962."76 Acting under the same
176. Presidential Proclamation No. 4074, 3 C.F.R. 80 (1971):
"Imposition of Supplemental Duty for Balance of Payments Purposes By the
President of the United States
A Proclamation
"WHEREAS, there has been a prolonged decline in the international monetary
reserves of the United States, and our trade and international competitive position is seriously threatened and, as a result, our continued ability to assure our
security could be impaired;
"WHEREAS, the balance of payments position of the United States requires
the imposition of a surcharge on dutiable imports;
"WHEREAS, pursuant to the authority vested in him by the Constitution and
the statutes, including, but not limited to, the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Tariff Act') and the Trade Expansion Act of 1962
(hereinafter referred to as the 'TEA'), the President entered into, and proclaimed
tariff rates under, trade agreements with foreign countries;
"WHEREAS, under the Tariff Act, the TEA, and other provisions of law, the
President may, at any time, modify or terminate, in whole or in part, any proclamation made under his authority;
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, RICHARD NIXON, President of the United States
of America, acting under the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the
statutes, including, but not limited to, the Tariff Act, and the TEA, respectively,
do proclaim as follows:
"A. I hereby declare a national emergency during which I call upon the public
and private sector to make the efforts necessary to strengthen the international
economic position of the United States.
"B. (1) I hereby terminate in part for such period as may be necessary and
modify.prior Presidential Proclamations which carry out trade agreements insofar
as such proclamations are inconsistent with, or proclaim duties different from,
those made effective pursuant to the terms of this Proclamation.
"(2) Such proclamations are suspended only insofar as is required to assess a
surcharge in the form of a supplemental duty amounting to 10 per cent ad valorem. Such supplemental duty shall be imposed on all dutiable articles imported
into the customs territory of the United States from outside thereof, which are
entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption after 12:01 a.m., August
16, 1971, provided, however, that if the imposition of an additional duty of 10 per
cent ad valorem would cause the total duty or charge payable to exceed the total
duty or charge payable at the rate prescribed in column 2 of the Tariff Schedules
of the United States, then the column 2 rate shall apply.
"C. To implement section B of this Proclamation the following new subpart
shall be inserted after subpart B of part 2 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules
of the United States: SUBPART C-TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS FOR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PURPOSES

Subpart C headnotes:
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authority, the President proceeded to terminate temporarily and
modify prior presidential proclamations implementing those trade
agreements insofar as those proclamations were inconsistent with
Proclamation No. 4074. "Such proclamations are suspended only
insofar as is required to assess a surcharge in the form of a supplemental duty amounting to ten per cent ad valorem.""' The supple1. This subpart contains modifications of the tariff schedules proclaimed by
the President in Proclamation 4074.
2. Additional duties imposed-The duties provided for in this subpart are
cumulative duties which apply in addition to the duties otherwise imposed on the
articles involved. The provisions for these duties are effective with respect to
articles entered on and after 12:01 a.m., August 16, 1971, and shall continue in
effect until modified or terminated by the President or by the Secretary of the
Treasury (hereinafter referred to as the Secretary) in accordance with headnote
4 of this subpart.
3. Limitation on additional duties-The additional 10 per cent rate of duty
specified in rate of duty column numbered 1 of item 948.00 shall in no event
exceed that rate which, when added to the column numbered 1 rate imposed on
the imported article under the appropriate item in schedules 1 through 7 of these
schedules, would result in an aggregated rate in excess of the rate provided for
such article in rate of duty column numbered 2.
4. For the purposes of this subpart(a) Delegationof authority to Secretary-The Secretary may from time to time
take action to reduce, eliminate or reimpose the rate of additional duty herein or
to establish exemption therefrom, either generally or with respect to an article
which he may specify either generally or as the product of a particular country,
if he determines that such action is consistent with safeguarding the balance of
payments position of the United States.
(b) Publicationof Secretary's actions-All actions taken by the Secretary hereunder shall be in the form of modifications of this subpart published in the
FEDERAL REGISTER. Any action reimposing the additional duties on an article
exempted therefrom by the Secretary shall be effective only with respect to articles entered on and after the date of publication of the action in the FEDERAL
REGISTER.

(c) Authority to prescribe rules and regulations-TheSecretary is authorized
to prescribe such rules and regulations as he determines to be necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this subpart.
5. Articles exempt from the additionalduties-In accordance with determinations made by the Secretary in accordance with headnote 4(a), the following
described articles are exempt from the provisions of this subpart:
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1 The Presimental duty was imposed on "all dutiable articles." 78
dent, therefore, did not propose to assess a surcharge; he merely
suspended previously negotiated concessions to the extent required
to achieve the equivalent of a ten per cent surcharge. This procedure was, in fact, realistic since any concession proclaimed in
carrying out a trade agreement pursuant to the Trade Expansion
Act or the Trade Agreements Act was accorded most-favorednation treatment."9 Moreover, the concessions negotiated during
the Kennedy Round were extended to all members of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade' 0 through operation of the mostfavored-nation clause in article I of the Agreement.'81 The President was able, in effect, to assess a ten per cent surcharge by
suspending concessions. The issue is his authority to suspend or
temporarily terminate these concessions in order to correct a balance of payments deficit.

Item

Article

RATES OF DUTY
1

2

948.00 Articles, except as exempted under headnote
5 of this subpart, which are not free of duty
under these schedules and which are the
subject of tariff concessions granted by the
United States in tariff agreements ....

10% ad val... No

(See headchange.
note 3 of this
,subpart.)

D. This Proclamation shall be effective 12:01 a.m., August 16, 197i.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereto set my hand this fifteenth day of
August in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and seventy-one, and of the
Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and ninety-sixth.
Is/Richard Nixon
177. Proclamation No. 4074, § B(2), 3 C.F.R. 80, 81 (1971).
178. Proclamation No. 4074, § B(2), 3 C.F.R. 80, 81 (1971).
179. Most-favored-nation treatment was accorded under § 350(a) of the
Trade Agreements Act, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943 (1934). The most-favored.nation
clause in the Trade Expansion Act is found in § 251. 19 U.S.C. § 1881 (1970).
The products of Communist countries have been excluded from most-favorednation treatment since 1951. Ch. 141, § 5, 65 Stat. 73 (1951). This exclusion has
been continued under the Trade Expansion Act. 19 U.S.C. § 1861 (1970).
180. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done October 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as GATT]. For a
general discussion of GATT see K. DAM, THE GATT, LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970); J. JACKSON, supra note 128.
181. GATT, art. I.
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A.

Statutory Authority Supporting the Import Surcharge

Four provisions of the Trade Expansion Act authorize duty increases: (1) section 232 (safeguarding national security); (2) section 252 (foreign import restrictions); (3) section 255 (termination); and (4) section 320 (presidential action after Tariff Commission determination). Moreover, section 201, which provides the
basic authority for trade agreements, grants the President the
power to "proclaim such modification or continuance of any existing duty or other import restriction, such continuance of existing
duty-free or excise treatment, or such additional import restrictions, as he determines to be required or appropriate to carry out
any such trade agreement."'' 2 Although the President's authority
to enter into trade agreements lapsed in 1967, it appears that the
time limitation found in section 201(a) (1) is not applicable to
section 201(a) (2).183
Proclamation No. 4074 does not specify the provisions of the
Trade Agreements Act or the Trade Expansion Act on which the
Executive relied. The Office of the General Counsel, Department
of the Treasury, however, subsequently issued Opinion No. 822,184
which states that the statutory authority is found in section 350(a)
(6) of the Trade Agreements Act and section 255(b) of the Trade
Expansion Act."8 5 These provisions appear to be logical bases for
the surcharge since both are unlimited. Section 302, on the other
hand, requires specific findings by the Tariff Commission' and
182. 19 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(2) (1970).
183. Although this interpretation may be questioned, it does not appear to be
unreasonable in light of the fact that subsection (a) (2) merely provides the President the authority required to carry out existing trade agreements, analogous to
the continued vitality of § 252(c). For a discussion of the relation of § 252(c) of
the most-favored-nation clause see United States v. Star Indus. Inc., 462 F.2d 557
(C.C.P.A. 1972).
184. Office of General Counsel, Dep't of Treasury, Opinion No. 822 (Sept. 29,
1971) [hereinafter cited as Opinion No. 8221.
185. The import surcharge is the subject of current litigation in the Customs
Court. Yoshida Int'l Inc. v. United States, Civil No. 72-2-00314 (Cust. Ct.). The
Government contends that the President had the power to terminate trade agreement proclamations, in whole or in part, at any time. Brief for Defendant at 4-5.
The Government distinguishes between terminating the agreements themselves,
and terminating the proclamations implementing the agreements. Thus, the Government argues, the President may terminate the proclamations under an agreement without terminating the agreement, and, subsequently, proclaim new proclamations under the agreement. In addition, the Government relies on § 5(b) of
the Trading with the Enemy Act. Brief for Defendant at 55.
186. Presidential action under § 302 is predicated on a finding by the Tariff
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section 232 requires findings by the Office of Emergency Preparedness.8 7 In addition, the existence of foreign import restrictions is a
prerequisite to action under section 252. No such prerequisites
were cited by the President in announcing the surcharge. On the
contrary, the President stated that the surcharge was "an action
to make certain that American products will not be at a disadvantage because of unfair exchange rates."'8 8
Therefore, the question naturally arises whether section 350(a)
(6) of the Trade Agreements Act and section 255(b) of the Trade
Expansion Act are sufficient to support the imposition of the surcharge. A difficult problem is presented by the language of these
provisions. Both sections utilize the phrase "terminate, in whole
or in part." This language suggests a more permanent action than
a mere suspension. The Executive, however, clearly interpreted
the terms "terminate" and "suspend" as synonomous. The President stated in paragraph B(1) of Proclamation 4074 that "I hereby
terminate in part for such period as may be necessary and modify
prior Presidential Proclamations" while in paragraph B(2) stating
that "[s]uch proclamations are suspended." (emphasis added)',"
In Star Industries, Inc. v. United States,"10 the Customs Court
distinguished the termination power of section 350(a) (6) of the
Trade Agreements Act and the suspension power of section 252(c)
of the TEA. The President had suspended tariff concessions on
brandy valued at over $9.00 per gallon, trucks valued at over
$1,000, potato starch and dextrine in retaliation to increased tariffs
on American poultry by the EEC. 9' The court noted that the President has the power to terminate the concessions under section
350(a) (6), but that the President actually had attempted merely
to modify the duty rates.' - The court concluded that the requireCommission that "as a result in major part of concessions granted under trade
agreements, an article is being imported into the United States in such increased
quantities as to cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury to the domestic industry producing an article which is like or directly competitive with the imported
article." 19 U.S.C. § 1901(b) (1) (1970).
187. The Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness must find that the
article is being imported in such quantities or under such circumstances as to
threaten or impair the national security. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (1970).
188. N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1971, at 14, col. 5.
189. Presidential Proclamation No. 4074, 3 C.F.R. 80 (1971).
190. 320 F. Supp. 1018 (Cust. Ct. 1970).
191. This increase in duty was the final action in the "chicken war." See
Walker, supra note 167.
192. 320 F. Supp. at 1023.
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ments of section 252(c), dealing with the President's suspension
power, would be controlling.'9 3 On appeal, the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals held that the President had complied with the
requirements of section 252(c), and, therefore, did not rule on the
Customs Court holding concerning section 350(a) (6).111 Nevertheless, the analysis of the Customs Court appears to be sound and is
supported by Falcon Sales Co. v. United States."5 Plaintiff had
protested the suspension of tariff concessions negotiated under the
Trade Agreements Act, which resulted in an increased duty on
spring clothespins. The Government relied on section 350(a) (6),
arguing that the President had merely terminated the previously
granted concessions. The Customs Court noted that the difference
between termination and suspension is one of intent. To terminate
is to halt an existing condition with no present thought of reactivating it in the future, whereas to suspend is to place an existing
condition in a state of dormancy with future reinstatement a presently considered possibility. 9 '
Under the Falcon rationale, Proclamation No. 4074 clearly intended to effect a suspension of tariff concessions. The proclamation itself demonstrates this fact by means of such language as
"modify prior Presidential Proclamations" and "such proclama197
tions are suspended.'
Opinion No. 822 relies on section 201(a) (2) of the TEA and
section 350(a) (1) (b) of the Trade Agreements Act for authority
to revive the operation of the concessions." Section 201(a) (2) of
the Trade Expansion Act, however, might be utilized more effectively to sustain the initial suspension. One difficulty in this regard
is that the modification must "be required or appropriate to carry
193. 320 F. Supp. at 1024.
194. United States v. Star Indus. Inc., 462 F.2d 557 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
195. 199 F. Supp. 97 (Cust. Ct. 1961).
196. 199 F. Supp. at 102.
197. In Yoshida, the Government refutes plaintiff's argument that termination "in whole or in part" is limited to a complete termination of certain concession rates under a proclamation while leaving other concessions unaffected. Brief
for Defendant at 27. The Government contends that under General Headnote 4(d)
to the Tariff Schedules of the United States whenever a proclaimed rate is

suspended or terminated the rate reverts to the statutory rate, unless there is
another intervening proclaimed rate. Terminating the prior rate and imposing a

new rate, the Government argues, constitutes a termination in part of the trade
agreement proclamation of the existing rate. Brief for Defendant at 27-28. This
argument, however, cannot be sustained under the rationale of Star Industries
and Falcon.
198. Opinion No. 822, supra note 184.
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out any such trade agreement."' 99 This requirement might be met
by relying on the purpose of trade agreements negotiated pursuant
to the Trade Agreements Act or the TEA. The purpose of trade
agreements under the Trade Agreements Act, according to section
301(a) (1), is to expand foreign markets for products of the United
States. 20 Likewise, the purposes of the TEA are to maintain and
enlarge foreign markets, to strengthen economic relations with foreign countries, and to prevent Communist economic penetration. 2"
The purpose of the surcharge was to improve United States balance of payments, 22 a problem that is inextricably bound to the
balance of trade problem. In conjunction with the temporary suspension of conversion of dollars into gold or other reserve assets,
the goal of the surcharge was to stabilize exchange rates, a result
that would necessarily enhance the position of United States products in foreign markets. Moreover, just as the most-favored-nation
clause insures that the benefits of trade agreements will flow to the
contracting parties to prior trade agreements, the most-favorednation clause in the TEA states that, except as otherwise provided,
any duty or other import restriction shall apply to products of all
foreign countries, whether imported directly or indirectly. 23 The
logical result is that this clause would operate to suspend the concessions to all countries that gained the benefit of the concessions
through most-favored-nation treatment. 24 Thus, after the proclamation of the surcharge, there was speculation that the surcharge
would not be applicable to the products of Communist nations,
since these nations have been excluded from most-favored-nation
treatment by section 231 of the TEA,0 5 and their products have not
been receiving the benefit of the concessions that were sus2
pended. 11
Therefore, section 201(a) (2) appears to provide a sounder basis
199.

19 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(2) (1970).

200. 19 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1) (1970).
201. 19 U.S.C. § 1801 (1970).
202. See note 188 supra and accompanying text.

203. 19 U.S.C. § 1881 (1970).
204. In United States v. Star Indus., Inc., the court determined that § 252(c)
is an exception to the operation of the general application of most-favored-nation
treatment. Interpreting the language of § 252(c) and the legislative history, however, the court held that the concessions should be suspended on a most-favorednation basis, since the action was taken under article XXVIII of GATT, which
contemplated most-favored-nation treatment. 462 F.2d at 561-63.
205. N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1971, at 20, col. 3.
206. See note 179 supra.
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for the imposition of the surcharge than section 255(b). The Executive, however, undoubtedly chose to rely on the termination provision because it is completely unrestricted, whereas section 201(a)
(2) requires that the modification be required or appropriate to
carry out a trade agreement. This is the type of problem to which
the proposed section 353 of the TEA was addressed. This section
would have alleviated the problem by authorizing the President to
raise or lower tariffs whenever he felt such action would be in the
national interest. An argument could be made that the proposed
section 353 is analogous to the proposals authorizing plant seizure
that were considered in Youngstown. Section 353, however, was a
general grant of power, whereas the proposal in Youngstown was
much more specific. Moreover, in 1971, the President had additional statutory authority in the absence of section 353. President
Truman, on the other hand, relied almost exclusively on his powers
as Commander in Chief. Although there is a superficial similarity,
the failure of Congress to enact section 353 is not sufficiently explicit to warrant a conclusion that Congress had preempted presidential action, as four justices felt was the case in Youngstown.
Therefore, the most persuasive statutory argument is that section 201(a) (1) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 authorized the
President to impose a surcharge. Although this argument is far
from conclusive, additional support may be found if the Executive's inherent powers in foreign affairs can be invoked.
B. , Inherent Powers
In Chicago & Southern Airlines, the Court stated that the President possesses certain inherent powers in foreign commerce.20 7 The
factual situation in that case, which involved foreign overflights,
had greater foreign affairs overtones than the present situation. As
these foreign affairs overtones in what is basically a foreign commerce problem diminish, the President's inherent powers correspondingly diminish. Therefore, an examination of the degree to
which the Executive's foreign affairs powers will apply requires an
analysis of the foreign commerce problem in terms of foreign affairs.
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 was titled "a Bill to promote
the general welfare, foreign policy, and security of the United
States. '28 The House Ways and Means Committee Report noted
three primary reasons for enacting the bill. First, the Committee
207.
208.

See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
See H.R. REP. No. 1818, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1962).
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noted that the EEC was a political necessity to bring the European
countries together to present a strong united front to the Soviet
threat. The need for close coordination with the EEC was cited as
a primary consideration. Secondly, the report stated that expanded trade with the less developed countries would lead to
greater stability and growth in those countries, thereby reducing
their vulnerability to Communist pressures. Thirdly, the Committee considered the bill to provide alternate markets to countries
that were the targets of Communist bloc economic pressure.2
In light of this background, one might conclude that the area of
trade agreements is an area in which the President, possessing
broad powers in foreign affairs, has certain inherent powers, even
though the regulation of foreign commerce is vested in Congress.
Indeed, the foreign affairs overtones in this area may be sufficient
to characterize it as one in which concurrent powers are exercised.
One must distinguish, however, between inherent and delegated
powers. The exercise of executive powers pursuant to a congressional delegation is not the equivalent of the exercise of inherent
powers. The former is subject to greater restriction by Congress
than is the latter. In Shurtleff v. United States,210 the Supreme
Court considered whether the President could remove an executive
officer for any causes other than those cited in the statute creating
the office. The Court noted that the President, by virtue of his
general power of appointment, may remove an officer, even in the
absence of a constitutional or statutory provision. The Court assumed, for the purposes of the case only, that Congress could attach conditions to the removal of the officer. This congressional
action, however, was not sufficient to deprive the President of his
general power of removal. The Court ruled that the power could
not be restricted by implication or inference. "The right of removal
would exist if the statute had not contained a word upon the subject. It does not exist by virtue of the grant, but it inheres in the
right to appoint, unless limited by Constitution or statute. It re21
quires plain language to take it away. '
This holding is essentially that of the four concurring justices in
Youngstown. They found that Congress had clearly circumscribed
the President's war power, a concurrent power, by refusing to authorize plant seizure.212 In Guy Capps, the court also found that
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 1-12.
189 U.S. 311 (1903).
189 U.S. at 316.
See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
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Congress had provided exclusive procedures, which the President
failed to follow. An essential difference between Youngstown and
Guy Capps is that the former involved an inherent power, i.e. the
President's power as Commander in Chief, while in the latter the
court stated that the President's source of power was derived from
a congressional delegation. In the case of the surcharge, the language of the Trade Agreements Act and Trade Expansion Act is
broader than that of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1948,
thereby giving rise to the conclusion that its procedures are not
exclusive. Moreover, the background of the TEA evinces more of
a foreign affairs concern that the 1948 Act.
Therefore, it appears that the Executive can invoke his inherent
powers in addition to the statutory delegation. The conclusion to
be drawn is that any congressional limitation must be explicit, for,
as shown by Shurtleff and Youngstown, the courts will not imply
the restrictions. This conclusion, however, is based on a finding
that trade agreements is an area in which concurrent powers are
exercised-Congress' power to regulate foreign commerce and the
21
Executive's broad power over foreign affairs. 1
The same policy considerations that dictate that the President
possess great flexibility in the conduct of foreign affairs are present
in the area of foreign trade, as recognized by Congress through its
authorizing foreign trade agreements. The Framers, recognizing
the need for discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs, created a
system of government in which the Executive is granted wide latitude in this area. Alexander Hamilton spoke of the need for
213. In the recent case of Consumers Union v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319,
(D.D.C. 1973), the court rejected the argument that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
and the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 preempted presidential power to enter into
agreements with private companies. The court declared that the President does
possess certain authority in the field of foreign commerce. "[T]here is nothing
in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 that makes its processes exclusive. Nor can
it be said that a general statute of uncertain application like the Sherman Act
was intended to preempt from the President his independent authority over foreign commerce. Compare the legislation and facts involved in Youngstown Sheet
and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 . . . (1952). While the legislative pattern
is indeed comprehensive and the President's authority has been narrowed, these
acts cannot be read as a congressional direction to the President prohibiting him
from negotiating in any manner with private foreign companies as to commercial
matters. Far more explicit legislation would be required to deprive the President
of this authority in foreign affairs where his preeminent role has quite properly
long had firm constitutional recognition." 352 F. Supp. at 1322-23. The court
held, however, that the President could not exempt the companies from the
operation of the Sherman Act.
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"[a]ccurate and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a
steady and systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and
uniform sensibility to national character; decision, secrecy, and
,214 The entire history of tariff regulation demon"...
dispatch .
strates that this aspect of foreign commerce is inextricably bound
to foreign affairs, with the necessary result that the Executive
possesses inherent powers in this field. Trade Agreements, therefore, may be characterized as an area of concurrent powers. Congress may be the ultimate decision maker, as in Youngstown, but
until that decision is made the President has a great deal of freedom to act.
Trade agreements and tariff regulation, however, are but one
facet of foreign commerce. There are other areas of foreign commerce in which the Executive undoubtedly possesses some inherent powers. To determine the extent of those po~vers, however,
each individual area must be scrutinized to ascertain the foreign
affairs impact. Nevertheless, this examination of trade agreements
and tariff regulation indicates that although section 201(a) (2) of
the Trade Expansion Act, standing alone, may not be sufficient to
sustain the imposition of an import surcharge, when read in the
light of the underlying requirements for discretion in the field of
foreign affairs that provision does provide a satisfactory basis for
the surcharge.
V.

CONCLUSIoN

A threshold question to a determination of how the courts would
rule on the import surcharge is whether the courts would rule at
all; that is, whether the validity of the import surcharge is a "political question." It should be noted at the outset that the determination of the existence of a political question is the exclusive responsibility of the judiciary. 2 5 In making this determination, the Supreme Court analyzes many factors; 26 the determinative factor,
however, is an analysis of the grounds on which the Court will have
21
to base its ultimate decision".
Thus, to a certain degree, ascertain214. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 507 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
215. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
216. In discussing the analysis of political questions in the field of foreign
affairs, the Court has stated: "Our cases in this field seem invariably to show a
discriminating analysis of the particular question posed, in terms of the history
of its management by the political branches, of its susceptibility to judicial handling in the light of its nature and posture in the specific case, and of the possible
consequences of judicial action." 369 U.S. at 211-12.
217. This conclusion is evident in Justice Brennan's discussion of political
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ing the existence of a political question goes to the merits of the
issue presented to the Court. Discussing the act of state doctrine,
Justice Harlan stated that "[i]t should be apparent that the
greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the
judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the courts can then
focus on the application of an agreed principle to circumstances of
fact rather than on the sensitive task of establishing a principle not
inconsistent with the national interest or with international justice.12 1 In the recent case of First National City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba,219 Justice Rehnquist stated that the act of state
doctrine is designed primarily to avoid embarrassment to the executive branch.22 1 Justice Brennan's dissent takes issue with this
point of view; the act of state doctrine is a political question, which
has its roots in the lack of consensus concerning the applicable
law. 22 1 Therefore, the Department of State's statement of position,
which, if followed by the Court, would preclude future embarrassment to the Executive, did not affect Justice Brennan's conclusion
that a political question had been raised. 2 2 Since the state of the
law is unsettled as a result of changing attitudes and policies, the
Court would be forced to make decisions based on political, as
questions: "Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of the government; or an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question." 369 U.S. at 217.
218. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
219. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).

220. 406 U.S. at 765.
221. "To the contrary, the absence of consensus on the applicable international rules, the unavailability of standards from a treaty or other agreement, the
existence and recognition of the Cuban Government, the sensitivity of the issues
to national concerns, and the power of the Executive alone to effect a fair remedy
for all United States citizens who have been harmed all point toward the existence
of a 'political question.'" 406 U.S. at 788.
222. Justice Brennan's position may be of great importance in the future since
Justices Stewart, Marshall and Blackmun joined in his dissent. Justice Douglas
favored adjudication of the issue on the grounds that the issue was raised in a
counter-claim and National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955),
was controlling. In a future case, these five Justices could constitute the majority.
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opposed to legal grounds. Such decisions are beyond the domain
of the Court, since at that point the Court ceases to function as a
judicial body and enters the realm of political conflict.
Applying the political question doctrine to the import surcharge,
it appears that the Court, in effect, would be making a political
decision, unless the Court could uphold the surcharge solely on
statutory grounds. If the statutory grounds are insufficient, however, the Court could resort to the inherent powers of the President. Since the scope of the President's powers in foreign commerce is not defined, the Court would be making a political decision. This situation should be contrasted to the one in
Youngstown, in which Congress had preempted presidential action. In Youngstown, the congressional action provided the basis
for a "legal" determination, a basis that is lacking in this situation.
This analysis does not predetermine the Court's holding; the Court
will examine the legal grounds before reaching a decision. The
legal grounds, however, must be present. Without legal grounds,
that is, congressional action, the case lies within Justice Jackson's
"zone of twilight." Into this zone the Court should not venture.
Within the area of concurrent powers Congress and the Executive
struggle for power. This struggle is an essential element in the
system of checks and balances. The struggle continues within a
framework that is constantly moving forward. The Court should
enter the struggle only when an impasse has been reached and the
movement of the entire framework has been halted.
David Pollard
David A. Boillot
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